is sitting on the judge's seat, scales in hand.

Moreover, it does not occur, till after he has decided, from the point of view of the eventualiter passive side, that this position holds good for the active r�le as well. Thus, on p. 19 (R., p. 24) we read: “That I could not wish for a general law to establish lying, because people would no longer believe me, or else pay me back in the same coin.” Again on p. 55 (R., p. 49): “The universality of a law to the effect that every one could promise what he likes, without any intention of keeping his word, would make the promise itself, together with the object in view, whatever that might be, impossible; for no one would believe it.” On p.

56 (R., p. 50), in connection with the maxim of hard-heartedness, we find the following: